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Last month a West German by the 
name of Markus Hess was given 
an 18-month suspended sentence 
after being found guilty of a 
bizarre series of international 
computer hacking offences. Ironi­
cally, he and his associates in the 
Kaos Komputer Klub had been 
selling information on American 
military-base computers to mem­
bers of Eastern European security 
organisations who have, by now, 
radically altered their strategic 
outlook, been thrown in jail, or 
been elected to parliament • take 
your pick.
W hile the Cold War which 
generated this particular incidence of 
hacking might have changed, the 
issue of who gets access to the vast 
and powerful computer networks 
which non around the globe is here to 
stay. Perhaps a new geography of 
information politics might take the 
place in part, at least, of the old Cold 
War territories.
Clifford Stoll, the man who track­
ed down Markus Hess, has
Eioneered experimental study of 
acking as a phenomenon and is one 
of the first to attempt to articulate 
these issues for a wider audience in 
his book The Cuckoo's Egg. (A 
potted version also appeared on the 
popular ABC science snow Quantum 
in July.) It reads like a high power
global detective story - which, in fact, 
it is.
Tuesday, June 23,1988: West Ger­
man police seize computer equip­
ment, discs and printouts from an 
apartment and a company office in 
Hanover. Shortly afterw ards, 
Markus Hess is picked up by police 
for breaking into American military 
computer networks to collect 
passwords and other information, 
kaos was allegedly selling the infor­
mation to KGB agents in exchange 
for large amounts of cash and 
cocaine. Hess was using an elaborate 
series of computer networks, exploit­
ing a few simple bugs in system 
programs. He was even able to con­
sume a large amount of free com­
puter and network time using the 
accounts of a large American defence 
contractor. Ironically, Hess was 
detected when Stoll found a 75c error 
in a billing system for computer time.
Bill Landreth is also a hacker, but 
of a slightly different kind. In his 
book Tne Cracker he presents an 
image of the cracker-style hacker as 
the loner, the outsider, prowling the 
frontiers of the computer networks. 
Like a figure from a Hollywood 
western, the hacker knows a tech­
nologically dynamic landscape with 
few laws or customs. A new world 
without a history, where everything 
has to be invented on the moment, if 
not exactly on the spot. (There is no 
spot exactly. The hacker moves in a 
logical space which is only inciden­
tally a movement in geographical 
space. They move in an information 
landscape, sometimes called 
cyberspace.) The hacker is a tester of 
limits, an uninvited guest in the sys­
tem . The system is a host to be 
pushed to the lim it but not 
destroyed. Landreth is very clear on 
the ethics of this kind of hacking: 
never destroy other people's data. 
The hacker appears within the sys­
tem to look and learn, and to prompt 
the host organism, the computer sys­
tem and its system managers to react.
Not all hackers are qui te so ethical, 
however. Some leave behind logic 
bombs'. Clifford Stoll recounts an in­
structive story in this regard in his 
book The Cuckoo's Nest. It starts 
with a phone call at 2.25 am from 
Gene Miya at NASA Ames 
Laboratory: "Help! Our computers 
are under attack". Stoll put the phone 
down and it rang again. This time, 
when he picked it up, it just beeped. 
Morse code from his own computer
at the Smithsonian Institute for 
Astrophysics, Cambridge, Mas­
sachusetts. His computer was under 
attack too!
Stoll represents another version of 
the hacker figure. The hacker as a 
legitimate user and manager of com­
puter systems who solves problems, 
who keeps the system not only run­
ning but innovating. Stoll had a 
reputation for coming up with ways 
to foil the other kinds of hacker, the 
Landreth and Hess-style crackers. So 
he was a logical person for Gene 
Miya to call. Stoll made some calls 
and discovered other networked 
computers were being attacked by a 
virus. He tried to log onto a computer 
at the Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory, California, where he 
used to work as a system manager 
and where his anti-hacker hacking 
career began. Stoll typed in a com­
mand he picked up from watching 
his Kaos hacker foes at Berkeley, and 
found that the Berkeley computer 
was infected. This gave him his first 
clue to the nature of the virus: the 
computer was interfacing wildly in 
all directions, trying to talk to every 
other computer it could reach. With 
the computer trying to connect to 
every other computer, the flow of 
inform ation was becoming a 
cacophony of noise, making the flow 
of information impossible, slowing 
the computer's processing down to a 
crawl.
Every time Stoll tried to shut down 
the connections, new ones would 
spring up. Like a biological virus, 
this one entered a system, replicated 
itself, and sent off copies to other 
computers. Many computers are 
linked together through networks 
such as Arpanet, which connects 
eighty thousand computers.
Computers have security systems 
to prevent noise of this sort getting in 
and ruining the system, but this virus 
infected some six thousand before 
being brought under control. The 
virus had been designed to exploit a 
security loophole in the electronic 
mailing system. Over the next couple 
of days, 'white hat* hackers battled 
this lone-gun 'black hat' across the 
United States. Some began unwind­
ing the machine code discovering 
how it worked and what exactly it 
did. Others wrote 'patches' to cover 
up the loopholes in the operating sys­
tems the virus exploited. All this in­
formation was exchanged across the 
country on electronic bulletin
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boards. In the space of a couple of 
days, all that was left to be dis­
covered was who wrote it. It turned 
out to be a student at Cornell Univer­
sity, Robert Morris jr, the son of the 
Chief Scientist at the National Com­
puter Security Centre, the only 
public part of the shadowy National 
Security Agency. The mob who are 
supposed to set the standards of 
computer security. What a Freudian 
nightmare!
Scientific computer systems tend 
to be very open networks, without 
elaborate security precautions. This 
allowed Hess and Landreth and the 
virus to slip through a loophole in the 
net and get into scientific, medical 
and even military computers, al­
though not highly classified ones. 
Networks rely on trust, or mutual 
, consensus between users about the 
correct use of the system. While they 
are relatively democratic systems for 
those with access to them, many 
people are excluded. Hence hacking 
raises complex ethical and political 
problems, many of whicn were 
recently discussed on an electronic 
bulletin board for Harper's 
, Magazine (March).
The fact that Hess had been 
through literally hundreds of com­
puters on the extensive American 
scientific and military networks-and 
not just American computers in
America, but also base computers in 
Japan and Alaska - meant that 
security would subsequently be 
tightened on scientific computer net­
works and information would flow 
more slowly. Hence, one can say that 
there is a broader, more abstract kind 
of logic bomb at work here: no matter 
how open a network is, no matter 
how democratic, somebody is being 
excluded.
As philosopher Michel Serres in­
sists, one only produces the passage 
of information between two people 
by excluding a third: by excluding 
the noise of other parties who want 
to be heard. Noise will stmggle to 
enter the system, and for any number 
of motives. The Russians want infor­
mation. The hackers might want 
money or glory or a good supply of 
coke, or some kind of oedipal rup­
ture, who knows? In any event tne 
ever-present threat of noise is the 
logic bomb within the system. The 
etnical question is whether noise is 
always necessarily a bad thing, or 
whether it has creative uses.
The idea of a logic bomb is useful 
as a suggestive metaphor for how 
complex information networks func­
tion -and dysfunction. There appear 
to be logic bombs in all kinds of in­
formation networks that were not 
consciously programmed. They are 
activated when noise traverses the
old boundaries and territories that 
used to characterise social life. These 
logic bombs are programmed into 
the information networks as an ac­
cidental byproduct. They are a 
byproduct of the complexities of 
power in an information intensive 
world. They are an unconscious form 
of negation. They are the unintended 
effects of planned rationality and the 
inevitable byproducts of conflict 
within the institutions which govern 
cyberspace. In a world where the net­
works are run by bureaucracies, and 
worse, where information about our 
credit ratings, sexual preferences, 
political affiliations, work absentee 
records and health are not even 
handled by bureaucrats but 
processed by machine, hacking be­
comes both a threat to individual 
privacy and a tactic for breaking 
through the secrecy of government 
data and the patent and copyright 
restrictions of the big corporations.
A little disorder in the networks 
might be essential to preserving 
liberty, and also for advancing the 
tools and technologies of informa­
tion systems. As St Just put it: the 
disorder of today is the order of 
tomorrow. Or as one of the hackers 
in Harper's said: 'There's a hacker 
bom every minute".
McKenzie Wark.
JUDY HORACEK
TAe i<Jt(| of evolution as progress towards increasing perfection  A as lony 
been discounted by enlightened thinkers. Now read on...
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